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INTRODUCTION

You have asked for our legal opinion on the patentability of
inventions claimed in U.S. patent applications 07/716,831, filed June 21, 1991
(the '831 application, or "'831"), 07/837,195, filed September 25, 1992 ('"195"),
and 07/952,911, filed February 12, 1993 ('"911"), all filed in the name of Craig
Venter and others and assigned to the National Institutes of Health "(NIH)."
We understand that NIH has abandoned these patent applications
and has no present intention of filing similar applications in the future, but
that NIH remains interested in the patenting of human DNA sequences from
a broader public policy perspective. We have therefore attempted to focus
on issues that are likely to recur in other patent applications filed by other
people and institutions involved in DNA sequencing rather than on
questions that are peculiar to the facts of these particular applications.
Nonetheless, we preface this opinion letter with the caution that the facts of
each patent case are unique. We have before us for consideration only these
three NIH filings, and we are not in a position to offer a definitive opinion
on the patentability of other inventions that may be claimed by other parties
and supported by different disclosures in different patent applications.
The expertise we bring to this issue is legal rather than scientific.
Many issues of patent law turn on the understanding of skilled practitioners
working in the field of the invention. We have identified these issues
throughout this letter.
We begin with a brief description of the NIH patent applications and
then turn to the patentability issues presented by these applications. In our
view, the most significant of these issues concern the utility, nonobviousness,
and disclosure requirements of the patent laws.
II.

THE NIH cDNA PATENT APPLICATIONS

The three applications under review seek patent protection for
inventions associated with the identification of approximately 6,800 partial
cDNA sequences, called "expressed sequence tags" ("ESTs") in the
applications, in the laboratory of Dr. Craig Venter at the National Institute
of Neurological Disorders and Stroke prior to his departure from NIH in July

1992. These sequences, which are typically 150-400 base pairs in length,
were obtained by partially sequencing randomly selected clones from human
brain cDNA libraries enriched by removing ribosomal and other common
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3

The applications include many different claims, which for

convenience we divide into the following groups:

•Sequence

claims (claims 1-3, 17-18, and 25-43

in the '195 application, and 1-3 and 19-20 in
the '911 application)

•Full gene claims (claims 4-18 and 47-54 in the
'195

application

and

4-16

in

the

'911

application)

•Purified form

claims (claims 19 in the '195

application and 21 in the '911 application)

•Construct

claims (claims 20-21 in the '195

application and 22-23 in the '911 application)

•Panel

claims (claim 22 in the '195 application

and 24 in the '911 application)

•Antisense

claims (claims 23 in the '195

application and 25 in the '911 application)

•Triple helix

claims (claims 24 in the '195

application and 26 in the '911 application)
The '831 application, which initially covered the first 315 ESTs as well
as the method for obtaining them, was subsequently converted into a
statutory invention registration covering only the method claims before
being rejected by the patent examiner. We do not address the patentability
of the method claims except insofar as it relates to the patentability of the
other claims. The sequences of the '831 application are included in the 2,421
sequences covered by the '195 application, which is a continuation-in-part of
'831. The claims of '195 were finally rejected by the Patent and Trademark
Office ("PTO") in August of 1993. The claims of the '911 application,
covering an additional 4,448 sequences, were rejected by the PTO in a first
office action in December of 1993. NIH abandoned all three applications in
February of 1994.
III.

lJTILITY

Perhaps the issue that has drawn the most attention in public
discussions of the patentability of the NIH cDNA sequences is whether these
sequences have patentable utility.

AIPLAQ.J.
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Background And Applicable Law

The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to provide patent
protection for the express purpose of promoting progress in "the useful
arts."1 In keeping with this language, the U.S. patent statute limits patent
protection to "useful" inventions2 and requires patent applicants to disclose
how to use their inventions.3 The utility requirement has at least three
interrelated dimensions to it, although the courts and the PTO are not
always clear about which of these dimensions is at issue in a given case.
First, an invention must serve a practical purpose.4 Second, it must be
"operable," or capable of use.5 Third, the invention as claimed must be
supported by a disclosure that is adequate to enable a skilled practitioner
working in the field to use the invention with no more than routine
experimentation.6
One source of difficulty in defining the content of the utility
requirement is a lack of clarity as to its underlying purposes. In the early
nineteenth century, Justice Story suggested that the standard of utility
should be considered satisfied so long as an invention has some beneficial
usfil and is not "frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound
morals of society."7 As long as the invention was not contrary to public
morality and policy, Story saw no reason why the public should object to the
patenting of an invention of very little utility: "If it be not extensively useful,

1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

2

35 u.s.c. § 101 (1988).

3

35 u.s.c. § 112 (1988).

4

Anderson v. Natta, 480 F.2d 1392, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 458 (C.C.P.A.)
1973). See 1 w. ROBINSON, TREATISE ON TI-IE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS (1890).
Newmann v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Fed. Cir.
1989).

5

6

35 u.s.c. § 112 (1988).

7

Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568).
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it will silently sink into contempt and disregard."8 In this view the utility
requirement merely serves to withhold patents on harmful inventions, and
it is the function of the market to limit the value of patents on inventions of
only minimal utility.
This was probably the dominant view of the utility requirement in
the United States through the middle of the twentieth century, except in the
case of inventions claimed to have value in the treatment of human disease.
Such inventions were subjected to a higher standard of proof of utility,
particularly in the days before the safety and efficacy of pharmaceutical
products were separately monitored by the Food and Drug Administration,
on the ground that issuance of a patent might mislead the public by
appearing to represent a government imprimatur of the value of a so-called
"patent medicine."9 Modem courts have explicitly disclaimed this higher
standard of utility for pharmaceuticals, 10 yet the double standard seems to
live on as a practical matter, as will become apparent from a review of the
cases.
The U.S. Supreme Court suggested a larger role for the utility
requirement in Brenner v. Manson. 1 1 The invention at issue in that case was
a new process for making certain known steroids. The patent examiner
rejected the claims on the ground that the applicant had failed to disclose
any utility for the chemical compounds produced by the process. The Board
of Appeals within the Patent Office affirmed the rejection, but the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals reversed, holding that an operative process for
producing a known product satisfies the utility requirement so long as the
product is not alleged to be detrimental to the public interest. The Supreme
Court reversed again in an opinion that raised at least as many questions as
it answered about the utility requirement.12

8

Id.

9

Mahler v. Animarium Co., 1 1 1 F. 530, 537 (8th Cir. 1901).

10

11

12

In re Langer, 503 F.2d 1380, 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
383 U.S. 519, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689 (1966).

Id. at 536, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 696.

6
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The Court explicitly rejected the view that the utility requirement is
met by any invention that is not positively harmful to society.13 Nor was
utility established by showing that the invention yields products that are
currently the subject of serious scientific investigation.14 The court was
particularly concerned that conferring patent rights in basic research
discoveries could create "a monopoly of knowledge" and "confer power to
block off whole areas of scientific development, without compensating
benefit to the public." 5
1 The court concluded that patent protection was
premature until the invention had been refined and developed to the point
where "specific benefit exists in currently available form." 61 The majority
opinion closed with the following passage: "A patent is not a hunting
_

license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful
conclusion. 'A patent system must be related to the world of commerce
rather than to the realm of philosophy. .."m One plausible reading of this
opinion is that the utility requirement serves a timing function, leaving basic
research discoveries in the public domain until they have yielded tangible
benefits and have thereby left "the realm of philosophy" and entered "the
world of commerce."
.

Whether or not there was a meaningful distinction to be drawn
between the realm of philosophy and the world of commerce in the field of
steroid chemistry in the 1960s, it is a very difficult distinction to maintain in
biotechnology in the 1990s, with researchers in government and university
laboratories seeking patent protection for their discoveries and with private
firms developing research tools for commercial sale. In this environment,
research discoveries that are the subject of serious scientific investigation
may be sold commercially to researchers long before they have ripened into
products for sale to the general public. How far must an inventor go to
establish that such an invention offers a "specific benefit ... in currently
available form?"

13

Id. at 533, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 695.

14

Id. at 536, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 696.

15

Id. at 534, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 695.

16

Id. at 534-35, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 695.

17 Id. at 536, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 696 (quoting In re Ruschig, 343 F.2d
965, 970, 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 274, 279 (C.C.P.A. 1965)).
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This question has been particularly difficult to answer for
pharmaceutical inventions, which often involve separately discovered
products and uses. Decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit and
. its predecessor, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
have upheld the sufficiency of disclosures of pharmacological activity in vitro
as establishing the practical utility of a novel compound.18 In Cross v. Iizuka,
the Federal Circuit acknowledged that "in vitro testing is but an intermediate
link in a screening chain which may eventually lead to the use of the drug
as a therapeutic agent in humans," but nonetheless concluded that this link
was sufficient to establish a practical utility for the compound, noting:
"Successful in vitro testing will marshal resources and direct the expenditure
of effort to further in vivo testing of the most potent compounds, thereby
providing an immediate benefit to the public, analogous to the benefit
provided by the showing of an in vivo utility."19 This suggests a more
hospitable attitude toward the patenting of early stage pharmaceutical
inventions than would be supported under a strict reading of Brenner v.
Manson.

However, in recent years biotechnology patent practitioners
perceived an increasing strictness on the part of the PTO in its application of
the utility requirement, particularly in the context of claims to methods of
treatment or to pharmaceutical compositions. A series of decisions from the
PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("the Board") reflects this
trend,20 which may finally b.e coming to an end n1 light of very recent
developments in the PTO and the Federal Circuit.21

18 Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 739 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 881 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
19

Cross, 753 F.2d at 1051, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 748.

20

See, e.g., Ex parte Sudilovsky, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1702 (Bd. Pat. App.
Interf. 1992); Ex parte Aggarwal, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1334 (Bd. Pat.
App. & Interf. 1991); Ex parte Balzarini, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892 (Bd. Pat.
&

App. & Interf. 1991).
21

These recent developments are the publication of new Utility
Examination Guidelines by the PTO, PTO Utility Examination Guidelines,
60 Fed. Reg. 36,263 (1995), and the decision of the Federal Circuit in In re
Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1995), both
discussed infra.
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In Ex parte Balzarini,22 the Board affirmed a rejection for lack of utility
of claims to pharmaceutical compositions in unit dosage form comprising
one of two specified ingredients that had shown antiviral activity against
HIV

in vitro. The Board agreed with the examiner that those skilled in the

art would regard the in vitro tests as a useful screening tool for selecting
which compounds are appropriate candidates for further testing, but
nonetheless held that the applicants had failed to satisfy their further burden
of demonstrating that those skilled in the art would accept the in vitro test
results as predictive of in vivo efficacy in treating humans who are HIV
positive or suffering from AIDS. The Board was careful to note that it was
not necessarily requiring clinical testing in humans to establish utility,
although it could be that nothing short of human clinical trials would satisfy
those skilled in this particular art that the claimed inventions would be
effective

in vivo.23

In Ex parte Aggarwal,24 the Board affirmed the examiner's rejection of
broad claims to a method of treatment of tumors in animals by administering
a therapeutically effective amount of recombinantly produced lymphotoxin.
The specification described preparation of recombinant lymphotoxin and
demonstration of in vivo activity in mice as well as in vitro activity. The
examiner took the position that given the unpredictability of the treatment
of tumors at the time of the filing, the limited test data of record were
insufficient to demonstrate utility across the broad range of the claims. In
affirming, the Board conceded that "[t]here is no question that appellants
have made an important discovery with regard to chemical compounds
(proteins) which are the subject of serious scientific investigation but of
unverified and speculative utility."25 The applicant argued unsuccessfully
that the public interest called for allowing the filing of a patent application
on such an invention early rather than waiting for what may be a long
period of experimentation. According to the Board, in light of Brenner v.
Manson and subsequent caselaw, such an application is premature until the
applicant "can provide evidence showing substantial activity in screening

22

21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1892.

23

Id. at 1897.

24

23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334.

25

Id. at 1339.
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tests customarily used and accepted as predicative [sic] of human activity for
the type of chemical tested " and "commensurate with the scope of utility
asserted and the subject matter claimed. " 26
The Board took a similar approach in another case involving a
method of treatment claim, Ex parte Sudilovsky.27 In that case the Board
affirmed rejection for failure to demonstrate utility of claims to a method for
inhibiting onset of or treating tardive dyskenesia, noting that the record
indicated lack of predictability in the art and that the specification did not
disclose experimental data or test results. 28
Two recent developments may signal an end to the trend in the PTO
toward increasingly restrictive applications of the utility requirement. First,
the PTO has published new Utility Examination Guidelines admonishing
examiners that a rejection for lack of utility is inappropriate if the applicant
makes an assertion of utility that would be credible to a person of ordinary
skill in the field or if the invention has a well-established utility. 29 An
accompanying legal analysis prepared by the PTO affirms that inventions
asserted to have utility in the treatment of human or animal disorders are
subject to the same utility requirement as inventions in other fields of
technology, and that "[O]ffice personnel should not construe§ 101, under the
logic of 'practical' utility or otherwise, to require that an applicant
demonstrate that a therapeutic agent based on a claimed invention is a safe
or fully effective drug for humans. .. . These general principles are equally
applicable to situations where an applicant has claimed a process for treating
a human or animal disorder. "30 These guidelines grew out of a PTO hearing
in October 1994 on intellectual property issues of concern to the
biotechnology industry, at which numerous witnesses complained that the
PTO had been mishandling the utility requirement and inappropriately

6
2

Id.

27

21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1 702 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1992).

28

29

Id. at 1 705.
PTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263 (1995).

30
Legal Analysis Supporting Utility Examination Guidelines, 50 Pat.,
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 297, 300 (Jul. 20, 1995) [hereinafter

Utility Examination Guidelines].
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demanding from patent applicants the sort of proof of clinical efficacy that
the FDA requires prior to approval of a new drug application.31

In

PTO
Commissioner Bruce Lehman underscored his commitment to implementing
announcing

the

proposed

guidelines

at

a

press

conference,

the new guidelines through improved training of the examiners and
supervisors and, if necessary, through changes in management practices or
personnel. 32
Second, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit very recently
reversed a PTO decision rejecting claims to a new pharmaceutical invention
for lack of utility in

In re Brana,33 chiding the PTO that the issue of

what an

applicant must prove to establish the utility of such an invention "is one
which we would have thought had been settled by case law years ago."34
The patent claims in that case were directed toward new chemical
compounds for use as antitumor substances. The prior art revealed that
structurally similar compounds had shown in

vivo activity against implanted

murine lymphocytic leukemias, and the specification reflected greater in vitro
activity against human tumor cells for the claimed compounds than for the
prior art compounds.

The examiner concluded that these tests were

insufficient to establish the utility of the claimed compounds, and the Board
affirmed.
The Federal Circuit reversed, indicating that the utility requirement
was more than satisfied in this case. First, the court noted that disclosures
of utility in the specification are presumptively correct unless manifestly
based on implausible scientific principles, and that "treating cancer with
chemical

compounds

does

not

suggest

an inherently

unbelievable

31 See, e.g., Biotechnology Industry Organization, Critical Synergy: The
Biotechnology Industry and Intellectual Property Protection, Presentations of

the Intellectual Property Committee of the Biotechnology Industry
Organization at the Hearing of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(October 1 7, 1994).
32

PTO Announces New Biotechnology Guidelines, 49 Pat., Trademark and

Copyright J. (BNA) 223, 224 (Jan. 5, 1995).
33

51 F.3d 1560, 1562, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

34

Id. at 1564, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439.
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undertaking or involve implausible scientific principles." 35 The burden was
initially on the PTO to provide evidence showing that someone of ordinary
skill in the art would reasonably doubt the asserted utility. 36 The PTO had
not met this burden, and thus the burden of proof did not shift back to the
applicants for rebuttal. However, even if the burden had been shifted, the
court was satisfied that the applicants had proferred sufficient rebuttal
evidence to establish the utility of the compounds in the form of data
showing significant antitumor activity in vivo in mouse models. 37 The court
dismissed the PTO's argument that in vivo tests in animals are not
sufficiently predictive of therapeutic efficacy in humans to establish utility
with a sharp reminder to the PTO of its limited role in the regulation of
pharmaceuticals:
The Commissioner, as did the Board, confuses
the requirements under the law for obtaining
a patent with the requirements for obtaining
government approval to market a particular
drug for human consumption. . . . FDA
approval . . . is not a prerequisite for finding
a compound useful within the meaning of the
patent laws. . . . Usefulness in patent law, and
in particular in the context of pharmaceutical
inventions, necessarily includes the
expectation of further research and
development. . . . Were we to require Phase II
testing in order to prove utility, the associated
costs would prevent many companies from
obtaining patent protection on promising new
inventions, thereby eliminating an incentive
to
pursue, through
research and
development, potential cures in many crucial
areas such as the treatment of cancer. 38
Id. at 1566, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441 (citing In re Jolles, 628 F.2d
1322, 1327, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 885, 890 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).

35

36

Id.

37

Id. at 1567, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441-42.

38

Id. at 1567, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442-43.
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The latest word from both the Federal Circuit and the PTO thus suggests
that the utility standard for biotechnology inventions may be receding from
its recent high-water mark.
Although proof of clinical efficacy may no longer be required to
establish patentable utility, it bears emphasis that both the PTO and the
Federal Circuit continue to require that, at least in cases where the invention
does not have a well-established utility, the utility of a claimed invention be
specifically identified in the patent application. Thus in its Legal Analysis
Supporting Utility Examination Guidelines, the PTO observes that "a statement
that a composition has an unspecified 'biological activity' or that does not
explain why a composition with that activity is believed to be useful fails to
set forth a 'specific assertion of utility."'39 And in In re Brana the Federal
Circuit conceded that the PTO's argument that the application failed to
disclose a specific disease that could be treated with the claimed compounds,
thereby requiring undue experimentation before the invention could be put
to use, was "not without merit."40 In the end, however, the court was
satisfied that comparisons made in the application between the effectiveness
of the claimed compounds and prior art compounds implicitly asserted that
the claimed compounds were useful against lymphocytic leukemia.
Another recent decision of the Federal Circuit, in a case not involving
a pharmaceutical product, affirms that the utility requirement still operates
to withhold patent protection from inventions that are too far removed from
practical applications.41 In re Ziegler involved an appeal from a rejection of
a U.S.patent application claiming priority in the discovery of polypropylene
on the basis of a German patent application filed in 1954.42 The examiner
rejected the claims at issue in part on the ground that the German

39

Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 30, at 302.

40

Brana, 51 F.3d at 1565, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440.

41

In re Ziegler, 992 F.2d 1 197, 26 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1600 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

42 A U.S. patent application filed within one year of a foreign patent
application is treated as if it had been filed on the foreign filing date for
purposes of determining what counts as prior art, provided the foreign
application satisfies the disclosure requirements of U.S. law. 35 U.S.C. §
1 1 9 (1994); Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 158
(C.C.P.A. 1973).
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application failed to disclose a practical utility for polypropylene. That
application disclosed that polypropylene is "plastic-like" and that it may be
pressed into a flexible film with a characteristic infrared spectrum. A
previous court in another proceeding had rejected Ziegler's argument that
the disclosure that polypropylene is "plastic-like" established its utility, and
Ziegler was therefore precluded from relitigating this issue.43 Thus the only
remaining question was whether the disclosure that polypropylene is solid
and that it may be pressed into a flexible film with a characteristic infrared
spectrum was sufficient to establish a practical utility for the material. In
affirming the PTO's determination that it did, the Federal Circuit echoed the
concerns over premature filings expressed by the Supreme Court in Brenner
v.

Manson:44 "We are convinced that, at best, Ziegler was on the way to

discovering a practical utility for polypropylene at the time of the filing of
the German application; but in that application Ziegler had not yet gotten
there."45 The court concluded: "While we are cognizant of Ziegler's
noteworthy contributions to polymer chemistry, we must nevertheless abide
by the principle underlying 35 U.S.C. § 101 that a patent 'is not a reward for
the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion."'46
Under the standards set by these cases, the inventions claimed in the
NIH patent applications may well lack patentable utility, although the issue
is not entirely free from doubt. We tum to the specific facts of the Venter
applications.
B.

Utility Of The NIH Inventions

Plainly, these applications were drafted with the possibility of a
utility rejection in mind. The specifications are replete with imaginative
suggestions for how to use the claimed sequences, individually or in panels,
many of which are set forth in prophetic (untested) examples. The
specification recites that ESTs may be used as probes to isolate coding
sequences and complete genes, which may then be mapped to chromosomal
locations. They may be used as chromosome markers. Complete genes,

43

Ziegler, 992 F.2d at 1201, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604.

44

383 U.S. 519, 535, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689, 696 (1966).

45

Ziegler, 992 F.2d at 1203, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.

46 Id. (quoting Brenner, 383 U.S. at 536, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 696).
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isolated through use of the EST probes, may be expressed in recombinant
host cells to obtain their protein or polypeptide products. ESTs, or other
sequences obtained through the use of ESTs, may be used as diagnostic
probes, to deted the presence of a specific rnRNA in a particular cell type, or
in genetic linkage analysis, or to locate gene regions associated with genetic
disease. ESTs may be used to regulate gene expression through triple helix
formation or antisense methods. Panels of ESTs may be used for individual
identification for forensic and other purposes, a use for which the estimated
eighty-five percent of the ESTs that appear to come from noncoding regions
are said to be particularly well suited because polymorphisms are more
common in noncoding regions. Panels of ESTs specific to particular tissue
types may also be used as reagents to identify tissue specimens by organ
type or by species.
It is only necessary to show one practical utility for an invention in
order to patent it.47 Thus if any one of the utilities recited in the Venter
applications amounts to a practical utility and is supported by an enabling
disclosure, the sequences or panels of sequences that are shown in the
specification to have this utility will pass the utility test. Moreover, the
patent rights that could be obtained on the basis of such a disclosure of
practical utility would not be limited to use of the sequences for the
disclosed purposes, but would potentially extend to all uses of the
sequences.
The patent examiner was unimpressed by the suggested utilities, and
rejected the '195 appplication for lack of utility, among other grounds, in an
Office Action dated August 20, 1992:
The mere mention of general possible uses is
not sufficient to establish a definite utility
because the instant application does not
disclose a patentable utility for the
oligonucleotides or other nucleotides of the
claimed inventions in their currently available
form. Given what is disclosed in the instant
application, it would be necessary for one to
do further work in order to establish a utility
for many of the nucleotides embraced by the

47 35 u.s.c.

§ 101 (1994).
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claims. The instant application does not teach
one of skill in the art the significance of any
putative result of any of the tests or processes
alluded to in the application. Although the
oligonucleotides embraced by the claims may
be hybridized to a variety of different
preparations of other nucleic acids, one of
skill in the art has no clue as to the
significance of any results of such
hybridization because the instant application
fails to provide any basis for the
interpretation of any putative results. Thus,
given the invention in its currently available
form, others would be compelled to
experiment, interpret results, and invent a
patentable utility for the claimed nucleotides.
In other words, the recited utilities were inadequate because a skilled person
reading the specification would have to engage in further undue
experimentation in order to put the claimed inventions to the suggested
uses.
As noted above, in order to satisfy the utility requirement, a patent
applicant must not only disclose a specific, practical use for the claimed
invention but must also provide a disclosure that enables others working in
the same field to use the invention in the described manner without having
to do more than routine experimentation. Whether this enablement
dimension of the utility requirement has been satisfied as to the recited
utilities depends on the state of knowledge in the field at the time of filing
and the level of skill among ordinary practitioners working in the field.48
Working examples in the specification may help in satisfying this
requirement, particularly if they indicate that the applicant has successfully
put the invention to the recited uses. Prophetic examples that describe how
to do something the applicants have not yet done in their own laboratories
are less probative of enablement, but they may be sufficient if there is no
reason to doubt that the instructions are adequate to make the invention

48 In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495-96, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438, 1444 (Fed.
Cir. 1991); In re Sichert, 566 F.2d 1154, 1161, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 209, 215
(C.C.P.A. 1977).
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operable for the described use without undue experimentation.49 On the
other hand, if a person with ordinary skill in the field would question the
validity of the applicants' assertions of utility, the burden of proof shifts to
the applicants to demonstrate their truth.50
Application of these principles is highly specific to the facts of
particular cases. The requirement is harder to satisfy without actual data
showing success in the laboratory in fields that exhibit greater
unpredictability in experimental outcomes. Thus, patent examiners are
typically more skeptical of asserted utilities based on prophetic examples for
chemical inventions than for mechanical inventions. Examiners have shown
particular skepticism toward unproven utilities for drugs and therapeutic
inventions, although this attitude may be changing in light of the recent
developments discussed above.
Returning to the Venter application with these general principles in
mind, the disclosed utilities that are most vulnerable to challenge are those
that either (1) do not indicate a specific purpose for which the inventions
may be used, or (2) depend for their operability on the success of
experiments that have not been performed and are not certain to work in the
minds of other practitioners of ordinary skill in the field. The former
category would seem to include the claimed utilities as diagnostic probes in
genetic linkage analysis, as probes to locate gene regions associated with
genetic disease, for regulation of gene expression through antisense and
triple helix methods, and for differentiating tissue types. Even if these
asserted utilities no longer trigger the heightened skepticism as to
operability and enablement recently applied by the PTO to pharmaceutical
and therapeutic inventions, they remain vulnerable to challenge on the
ground that undue experimentation would be necessary in order to
determine which if any diagnostic or therapeutic purposes any of the ESTs
might serve. Yet each of these utilities is described in broad, general terms
and in purely prophetic examples, unsupported by specific experimental

See Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. DuPont Nemours, 750 F.2d 1569, 1577, 224
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409, 414 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharmaceutical Co., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1775 (D. Mass. 1989).
49

50

See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1441 (Fed.
Cir. 1995); In re Bundy, 642 F.2d 430, 433, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 48, 51
(C. C.P.A. 1981).
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data that would identify the significance of any particular sequence to any
particular disease.
We lack the technical expertise to evaluate which of the remaining
utilities would be met with skepticism by skilled persons in the field or
would require undue experimentation to carry out. Uses of the disclosed
sequences as probes for diagnosing disease gene regions or to control gene
expression through triple helix formation or DNA or RNA antisense
molecules seem particularly vulnerable to challenge on this basis. Each of
these utilities seems to require a subsequent research effort that appears
fraught with uncertainty on the basis of the limited information provided in
the specification and the state of the art.
The asserted utility of panels of sequences for tissue typing or for
forensic identification purposes may also be vulnerable on this ground. The
utility of the sequences in tissue typing depends on the sequences being
variably expressed in different types of tissue. The specification states that
subtractive hybridization was used to selectively remove sequences shared
by a cDNA library from a human lung fibroblast cell line, but it does not
indicate which of the remaining sequences is unique to brain tissue.
Similarly, the utility of the sequences for forensic identification purposes
depends on their being polymorphic. The specification states that eighty
five percent of the sequences appear to come from noncoding regions and
that polymorphisms are particularly common in noncoding regions, but it
does not indicate which, if any, of the sequences is in fact polymorphic.
Perhaps these difficulties can be overcome by using panels that are so large
that the likelihood of variable expression by tissue type or polymorphisms
across individuals becomes overwhelming. But in that case the asserted
utilities would only seem to support the patentability of these large panels,
and not of smaller panels or of individual sequences.
A related problem is that the disclosure gives only limited guidance
as to which of the sequences (or which combinations of sequences) are
suitable for which of these uses. The process of selection may itself involve
undue experimentation. As Examiner Martinell stated in reference to the
panel claims, "[T]he panel of oligonucleotides in claim 22 has no patentable
utility because the instant application fails to disclose a single such panel out
of the astronomical number of such panels possible and disclose any use for
such a putative panel in its currently available form." Moreover, even if the
disclosure is fully enabling as to how to select appropriate sequences or
panels, the disclosed utilities will only support the patentability of those

18

AIPLAQ.J.

Vol 23: 1

sequences or panels that are useful for those purposes and not the others.
To the extent that the disclosed utilities work only for some of the sequences
or only for some panels of sequences, the claims are overly broad.
Of all the asserted utilities for the ESTs, the most credibly operable
and enabled are the use as probes to obtain full cDNA sequences and the use
as chromosome markers. Although only a small handful of cDNAs
corresponding to ESTs had actually been fully sequenced as of the filing
date, the same procedure could be readily followed by other skilled persons
in the field if they were motivated to do so. Similarly, although only a small
fraction of the ESTs had actually been mapped to chromosomes as of the
filing date, mapping the others according to the methods disclosed in the
specification may involve no more than routine experimentation.51 But these
uses may be particularly vulnerable to challenge under Brenner v. Manson as
representing utility only as an object of study in subsequent research rather
than showing "specific benefit ...in currently available form."
Use of the ESTs as probes to obtain full cDNA sequences has no
practical benefit unless and until the full sequences themselves may be used
for some purpose beyond research. Subsequent research may well prove
some of the genes useful for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes, but the
information disclosed in the specification fails to identify which of the genes
will be useful, or for which purposes. Practical utility of the sequences
awaits determination of the function of the genes they are associated with,
thus implicating the concern for premature filing underlying the decisions
in Brenner v. Manson52 and In re Ziegler.53
This concern with premature filing seems particularly on target in
this context because it parallels the reactions of scientists to the NIH filings.
Scientists quoted in the popular and scientific press repeatedly expressed an

51 Examiner Martinell assumed otherwise in his second office action dated
August 10, 1 993, in which he noted that a DNA sequence covered by the
claims may hybridize to more than one chromosome. If this is correct,
then the disclosure is inadequate to enable use of the sequences for
mapping and the utility of the sequences has not been established on this
basis.
52

383 U.S. 519, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689 (1966).

53

992 F.2d 1 197, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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intuition that NIH was claiming too much in light of the very preliminary
information that they had disclosed. 54 It seems likely that the PTO and the
courts might have a similar reaction, and that a utility rejection would
present an appealing doctrinal basis for expressing that view.
Use of the ESTs as markers presents a closer question. Assuming
that the disclosure is sufficiently enabling to allow the sequences to be
mapped, the mapped sequences may be useful as markers right away
without waiting to learn what genes they come from or the functions of
those genes. Such markers are sold commercially, albeit to researchers.
Does the existence of a commercial market among researchers confer
patentable utility on research reagents?
Existing caselaw does not
unambiguously resolve this question, and policy arguments could be made
on either side of the issue. One could argue that research tools are like the
process for making the steroid at issue in Brenner v. Manson55-merely a
means for facilitating subsequent research and not yet offering any "specific
benefit . . . in currently available form." Moreover, there are reasons to be
wary of patents on research tools, including concerns that they might be
licensed on an exclusive basis to the detriment of subsequent research.56 On
the other hand, genetics research is big business, and private firms are
playing a growing role in generating tools for the use of genetics researchers
in the public and private sectors. Withholding patent protection from
research tools could undermine incentives to develop such tools in the
private sector and to make them available to researchers. In the absence of
patent protection, a public institution such as NIH will presumably place its
research tools in the public domain; the same cannot necessarily be expected
of the private firms whose sequencing efforts in recent years have far
outpaced those of NIH. Under these circumstances, it is not clear whether

54

See e.g., Robin Herman, The Great Gold Rush: U.S. Rankles Other Countries
With Preemptive Strike in the Race to Patent Human Genes, WASHINGTON
POST, June 16, 1992, at Zl 1; Earl Lane, Debate Over Gene Patent Application;
Scientists Argue NIH's Claim Will Choke a Free Flow of Data, NEWSDAY, May
19, 1992,

at 55.

55 383 U.S. 519, 148 U.S.P.Q.

(BNA) 689 (1966).

56

For an expanded discussion of this issue focussing on the controversy
over these particular patent applications, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg,

Technology Transfer and the Genome Project: Problems with Patenting Research
Tools, 5 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV'T 163 (1994).
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a strong view of the utility requirement for DNA sequences or other research
tools would on balance promote subsequent research or retard it.
In sum, although the utility issues raised by these patent applications
have no clear answers, in light of recent caselaw it is not surprising that the
PTO rejected the claims of the '195 application for lack of utility, nor would
we be surprised to see the Federal Circuit affirm the rejection on this ground.
The primary reasons for this reaction are: (1) many of the asserted utilities
involve use for vaguely identified diagnostic or therapeutic purposes, with
no indication of the particular diagnostic or therapeutic purposes for which
any particular sequence or group of sequences might be used; (2) most of the
sequences may not be put to the asserted uses without further
experimentation which appears to go beyond routine experimentation, and
the outcome of which is uncertain; and (3) the utilities that appear least
problematic on enablement and operability grounds-use of the sequences
as probes for finding full-length cDNAs or as chromosome markers-are
most vulnerable to challenge on the ground that they are merely of interest
to researchers and don't yet amount to practical utility in currently available
form.
IV.

NOVELTY

Two fundamental requirements for patent protection are that the
invention be new and that it be nonobvious.57 Both of these requirements
were invoked by the examiner in rejecting the '195 and '911 applications.
A.

Background And Applicable Law

An invention is new if it does not exist in the prior art (i.e., if it has
not been disclosed in prior patents or publications and was not known or
used by others).58 The novelty requirement is technical in that the claimed
invention must be identically disclosed in a single prior art reference in order
to be unpatentable.59 Thus patent lawyers who have the relevant prior art
references before them may often avoid novelty rejections by tinkering with
57

35 u.s.c. §§ 102, 103 (1994).

58

35 u.s.c. § 102 (1994).

59 RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 1440, 221
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 385 (Fed. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 468 U.S. 1228 (1984).
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the claim language to avoid covering subject matter that has been disclosed
in the prior art.
On the other hand, the novelty standard is at the same time quite
exacting, particularly for broadly worded claims, in the following sense: If
a prior art reference discloses something that falls within the scope of a
claim, the entire claim is invalid, even though much of what the claim covers
has not been disclosed in the prior art, and even if the applicant's disclosure
makes a significant contribution to the art that was beyond the
contemplation of those familiar with the prior art. For example, if a patent
is issued with a generic claim covering what is believed to be a new class of
chemicals, and it is subsequently discovered that a chemical previously in
use by others for an unrelated purpose belongs in that class and is therefore
covered by the claim, the claim is invalid in its entirety.
B.

Novelty Of The NIH Inventions

Because the novelty of a claimed invention is defeated by finding in
the prior art a single embodiment falling within the scope of the claim
language, it can be treacherous for broadly-worded claims, particularly if the
subject matter covered by the claims cannot be readily identified, and the
prior art can therefore not be searched effectively. Consider, for example,
the August 20, 1992 rejection of the '195 application, which included a
rejection for lack of novelty of claims that, as initially drafted, covered
portions of the dis<;_losed sequences that were at least fifteen nucleotides in
length. Among the prior art references cited by the examiner was a
Pharmacia P-L Biochemicals 1984 Product Reference Guide. This catalog
listed among the commercial reagents for sale two oligodeoxynucleotides,
oligo(dA) and oligo(dT), consisting of chains of repeated A and T
nucleotides, respectively. These commercially available sequences were
sufficient to defeat the novelty of the original broadly-worded claims
because some of the sequences disclosed in the specification included at least
one run of fifteen or more A or T nucleotides, and because the claim
language was drafted to cover portions of the sequences of at least fifteen
nucleotides. NIH responded to this particular rejection by narrowing the
claims to cover only fragments of at least 150 nucleotides, but even the
amended claims might be subject to a similar challenge.
Those claims that cover undisclosed gene fragments may be
particularly vulnerable to challenge on this basis at a later date because there
is no way of searching the prior art at present to determine whether it
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discloses sequences covered by these claims. For example, claim 17 of the
'195 application covers polynucleotide fragments at least 150 base pairs in
length from any gene corresponding to any of the disclosed ESTs. Such a
fragment could be from a remote region of the gene and have a DNA
sequence that is completely dissimilar to anything disclosed in the
specification. Since there is no way at present to determine what all of these
sequences are, one cannot search the prior art to determine whether the
claims are valid. A claim that does not define the invention with sufficient
clarity to allow a proper search of the prior art may be invalid for lack of
definiteness of the claim language, as discussed more fully below.6() But even
if a patent were to issue on such a claim, the claim could later be challenged
on the basis of prior art existing at the time of the filing that becomes salient
at a later date when it is realized that one of the ESTs corresponded to a gene
that had previously been fully or partially sequenced. If any sequence
covered by the claims may be found anywhere in the prior art, any claim
covering that sequence would be invalid in its entirety.
While we are not in a position to offer a definitive opinion on the
novelty of the claimed sequences, it is worth noting that the examiner also
has not conducted an exhaustive search of the sequences embraced by the
claims. Instead, the examiner searched the prior art for matches to 15-mer
regions from a small number of the disclosed ESTs. The examiner noted that
an exhaustive search of all possible 15-mer regions in just the 2,421
sequences disclosed in '91 1 would have taken until the year 2035 to
complete. It is not clear to us why the examiner was unable to search public
sequence databases for exact matches to any 15-mer region from any of the
disclosed sequences in the time available to him, but given that he did not
conduct such a search, it is possible that the prior art includes exact matches
to fragments even of the disclosed sequences that did not come to his
attention. The potential for overlooking pertinent prior art is magnified
when one considers the possibility that undisclosed (and therefore
unsearchable) sequences covered by the claims might also exist in the prior
art. The broader the claims, the more likely they are to lack novelty.
V.

NONOBVIOUSNESS

Whereas the novelty requirement asks whether a claimed invention
is identically disclosed in the prior art, the nonobviousness requirement asks

60

See infra Part VI. C.
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whether the invention represents a big enough technical advance to merit a
patent.
A.

Background And Applicable Law

A new and useful invention that someone of ordinary skill in the
field would consider obvious in light of the prior art may not be patented.6 1
Whether an invention satisfies this standard depends on (1) the scope and
content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary skill among practitioners in
the field of the invention; and (3) the differences between the invention and
the prior art.62 This determination turns on evaluation of technical facts that
are beyond our ken. Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated
that determinations of obviousness are ultimately legal judgments,63 and so
we turn to the relevant case law.
We begin by noting that existing case law leaves some uncertainty as
to the proper analytical approach to take in determining the obviousness of
a novel DNA sequence. A major source of confusion is a lack of clarity in the
cases as to whether the requisite nonobviousness is to be found in the
method of obtaining the sequence or in the sequence itself. Section 103 of the
Patent Act recites that "[p]atentability shall not be negatived by the manner
in which the invention was made."64 This inartful language is generally
understood to mean that an invention may be patentable even if it was
arrived at through tedious but routine experimentation rather than through
ingenious insight.65 As long as the end result is nonobvious, the path by
which the inventor got there should not defeat patentability. This principle
has been particularly important in the chemical arts, where methods for
synthesizing new chemicals are often obvious to practitioners of ordinary
skill. Such new compounds may be deemed prirna fade obvious if they are
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Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 11, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 464 (1966)
(citing Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851)).
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35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994); id. at 11, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 464.
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In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1557, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210, 1214 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
64

35 u.s.c. § 103 (1994).
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Graham, 383 U.S. at 15 n.7, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 474 n.7.
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structurally similar to known compounds, but a patent applicant may
nonetheless rebut the case of prima fade obviousness by showing that the
compounds possess new and unexpected properties not present or
suggested in the prior art.66 The focus is on the product and its properties
rather than on the method of making the product.
On the other hand, some cases have upheld the patentability of
obviously desrrable products on the basis of evidence that inventive skill was
required to figure out how to make them,67 although arguably if the
inventiveness resides in the method of making the product rather than in the
product itself only the method should be patentable.
Some early cases addressing the patentability of DNA sequences
focussed on the obviousness of the method used to isolate the sequence
rather than attempting to address separately the obviousness of the sequence
itself. For example, in Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,68 a defendant
in an infringement action challenged the validity of a patent claiming a
purified and isolated DNA sequence encoding human erythropoietin
("EPO") and host cells transformed with such a sequence. The district court
rejected this challenge on the basis of its finding that the probing and
screening methods used by the inventor to isolate the gene were nonobvious.
The Federal Circuit affirmed, but suggested in a footnote that it was not clear
whether the analytical approach to this issue taken by the parties and the
district court was correct:
We note that both the district court and the
parties have focused on the obviousness of a

66

In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 691, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897, 1900 (Fed. Cir.

1990).

E.g., In re Pilkington, 411 F.2d 1345, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145 (C.C.P.A.
1969) (applicant who invented a "float glass" process for making sheet
glass that was free of imperfections was entitled to claim the product itself
in a product-by-process claim and should not be limited to obtaining
process claims); Shaw v. E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co., 417 F.2d 1097, 162
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 580 (2d Cir. 1969) (patent on an artificial filament adapted
for use as brush bristles was valid where the means of making such a
product was nonobvious), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1076 (1970).
67
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927 F.2d 1200, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.,
Genetics Inst., Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
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process for making the EPO gene, despite the
fact that it is products (genes and host cells)
that are claimed in the patent, not processes.
We have directed our attention accordingly,
and do not consider independently whether
the products would have been obvious aside
from the alleged obviousness of a method of
making them. 69
Two years later, the court appeared to focus more on the structure of
a DNA sequence than on the method of obtaining it in reversing a
determination of obviousness in the case of In re Bell.70 The claimed
inventions in that case were DNA and RNA molecules encoding human
insulin-like growth factors I and II ("IGFs"). The Board concluded that prior
art disclosing the amino acid sequences for the proteins and a general
method for isolating genes for which a portion of the amino acid sequence
is known by preparing nucleotide probes was enough to make the entire
nucleotide sequence prima fade obvious. The Federal Circuit reversed in an
opinion that stressed the unpredictability of the structure of the DNA
sequence arising from the degeneracy of the genetic code:
It may be true that, knowing the structure of
the protein, one can use the genetic code to
hypothesize possible structures for the
corresponding gene and that one thus has the
potential for obtaining that gene. However,
because of the degeneracy of the genetic code,
there are a vast number of nucleotide
sequences that might code for a specific
protein. In the case of IGF, Bell has argued
without contradiction that the [amino acid
sequences disclosed in the prior art] could be
coded for by more than 1036 different
nucleotide sequences, only a few of which are
the human sequences that Bell now claims.
Therefore, given the nearly infinite number of

69

Id. at 1207 n.3, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031 n.3.
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991 F.2d 781, 784, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1529, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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possibilities suggested by the prior �rt, and
the failure of the cited prior art to suggest
which of those possibilities is the human
sequence, the claimed sequences would not
have been obvious.71
Although this language suggests a very generous attitude toward the
nonobviousness of DNA sequences, the court went on to note several facts
present in that case that could limit its precedential value in other cases.
First, the court noted that Bell's sequence claims were narrow:
Bell does not claim all of the 1036 nucleic acids
that might potentially code for IGF. Neither
does Bell claim all nucleic acids coding for a
protein having the biological activity of IGF.
Rather, Bell claims only the human nucleic
acid sequences coding for IGF.
Absent
anything in the cited prior art suggesting
which of the 1036 possible sequences
suggested by [the prior art] corresponds to
the IGF gene, the PTO has not met its burden
of establishing that the prior art would have
suggested the claimed sequences.72

71

Id. at 784, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532. One Board case also arguably
takes a structural approach to determining the obviousness of a claimed
DNA sequence. Fiddes v. Baird, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Bd. Pat. App.
& Interf. 1993). In that case, the Board stressed structural differences
between the prior art DNA sequence for mammalian and bovine basic
fibroblast growth factors (FGFs) and the claimed DNA sequence encoding
human basic FGF, rather than processes for obtaining the target genes, in
concluding that the claimed sequences were not rendered obvious by the
prior art. But that case had somewhat idiosyncratic facts, including that
the Board elsewhere had held the prior art patent to be nonenabling, thus
making it difficult to generalize from its holding. Moreover, the Board
cited the process-focussed nonobviousness holding in Amgen in support
of its decision, making it unclear whether it was the nonobviousness of the
structure of the sequence . or the nonobviousness of the method of
obtaining the sequence (or both) that provided the basis for the decision.
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Bell, 991 F.2d at 784, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.
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This left open the possibility that broadly worded claims to a DNA sequence
encoding a protein with a known amino acid sequence might be rejected as
obvious. The basis for the distinction would be that the prior art might make
obvious

a DNA

sequence encoding the protein, but not

the

particular

sequence covered by the claim. 73
Second, in In

re Bell74 the Federal Circuit interpreted the prior art cited

by the examiner as discouraging or "teaching away from" a successful

method for finding the target gene because the disclosed method suggested
designing a probe based on an amino acid sequence specified by unique
codons. This approach would not have worked for finding the IGF genes,
because one of them had only a single amino acid with a unique codon and
the other had none. The salience of these facts to the court is inconsistent
with its apparent focus earlier in the same opinion on structure rather than
on the method of obtaining the gene and suggests that it might have reached
a different decision if prior art had been cited that suggested a broader range
of probing strategies.
The Board distinguished in re Bell on this latter basis in Ex parte
Deuel.75 In that case the prior art disclosed a partial amino acid sequence for
heparin binding growth factors ("HBGFs") and general cloning methods. In
holding that this was sufficient to make the gene prima facie obvious, th.e
Board distinguished

Bell on the ground that in that case the prior

away from a viable process for cloning the gene, while in

art taught

Deuel

the

applicants did not challenge the examiner's assertion that the probing
procedure set forth in the prior art would have allowed isolation of the gene

73

The Board distinguished Bell in part on this basis in Ex parte Movva, 31
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1993). In that case, the
Board affirmed rejection of claims to DNA sequences and recombinant
DNA molecules encoding swine growth hormone or polypeptides
displaying the biological activity of swine growth hormone where the
claims were drafted to include degenerate sequences encoding the same
protein. "If the reasonable expectation of success found to be lacking in Bell
can be analogized to the likelihood of hitting the center of the bulls-eye on
a dart board, the present reasonable expectation of success would be more
akin to merely hitting any spot on the dart board." Id. at 1034.
74

991 F.2d at 785, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532.

75 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445, 1449 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1993), rev'd sub
nom; In re Deuel, 31 F.2d 1552, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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without undue experimentation and with a reasonable expectation of
success.76

The Board _noted that they "do not lightly dismiss appellants'

argument that the examiner has not given sufficient weight to the structure
or form of the compound or composition, and has improperly concentrated
on the method of making it,"77 yet, in the end, they did not waver from this
process-centered approach. 78
The Federal Circuit very recently reversed this decision of the Board
in an opinion that calls into question both of these possible limitations on the
reach of its previous decision in

In re Bell.79

First, the court reaffirmed that

the obviousness of a DNA sequence is to be determined by reference to its
chemical structure rather than by considering the manner of its isolation.
The court squarely held that a cDNA sequence was not rendered prima fade
obvious by prior art disclosures of a partial amino acid sequence for a
protein, plus a general method of isolating a cDNA molecule, if there are no
structurally similar DNA molecules in the prior art:
A prior art disclosure of the amino acid
sequence of a protein does not necessarily
render particular DNA molecules encoding
the protein obvious because the redundancy

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

See also Ex parte Tanksley, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384 (Bd. Pat. App. &
Interf. 1992) (affirming rejection of claims to tomato cDNA clones that
included ribulose biphosphate carboxylase ("RuBPC") genes in part on
grounds of obviousness, where they were isolated in a manner disclosed
in the prior art and the procedures utilized to establish the function of
those clones were all well-known in the art, whether or not the exact
sequence of any of the clones was identical to the sequence of previously
disclosed RuBPC clones); Ex parte Movva, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027 (Bd.
Pat. App. & Interf. 1993) (affirming rejection of claims to DNA sequence
and recombinant DNA molecules coding for swine growth hormone based
on evidence that, at the time of the invention, one of ordinary skill in the
art had ample reason to isolate a DNA sequence encoding swine growth
hormone and would have found it obvious to do so using known
processes with a reasonable expectation of success).
79 In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210, 1215 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
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of the genetic code permits one to
hypothesize an enormous number of DNA
sequences coding for the protein.
No
particular one of these DNAs can be obvious
unless there is something in the prior art to
lead to the particular DNA and indicate that
it should be prepared. . . . This is so even
though one skilled in the art knew that some
DNA, albeit not in purified and isolated form,
did exist. The [claimed DNA sequences] are
specific compounds not suggested by the
prior art. 80
The court stated that the PTO's focus on methods for isolating the claimed
DNA sequences was "misplaced because the claims at issue define
compounds, not methods,"81 and cited In re Bell for the principle that "the
existence of a general method of isolating cDNA or DNA molecules is
essentially irrelevant to the question whether the specific molecules
themselves would have been obvious, in the absence of other prior art that
suggests the claimed DNAs."82 That the prior art might have been sufficient
to motivate those working in the field to prepare an undefined cDNA coding
for a known or partially known protein did not make obvious any particular
resulting cDNA sequence: "The fact that one can conceive a general process
in advance for preparing an undefined compound does not mean that a
claimed specific compound was precisely envisioned and therefore
obvious."83 This language suggests that a DNA sequence must be "precisely
envisioned," and not merely readily obtainable, in order to be obvious. Thus
the specific cDNA sequences set forth in the patent application were not
made obvious by the disclosure of a partial amino acid sequence and general
cloning methods.
Second, the court concluded that the prior art did not render obvious
the broader generic claims to all DNA sequences encoding HBGFs, although
80

81

82

83

Id. at 1558-59, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
Id. at 1559, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.
Id.
Id. at 1560, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216.

AIPLAQ.J.

30

Vol. 23: 1

the court suggested that such broad claims might have been obvious if the
full amino acid sequence for the protein had been disclosed in the prior art:
Such an idea ffiight have been obvious from
the complete amino acid sequence of the
protein, coupled with knowledge of the
genetic code, because this information may
have enabled a person of ordinary skill in the
art to envision the idea of, and, perhaps with
the aid of a computer, even identify all
members of the claimed genus. The [prior
art] reference, however, only discloses a
partial amino acid sequence, and thus it
appears that, based on the above analysis, the
claimed genus would not have been obvious
over this prior art disclosure.84
The court noted, however, that in the absence of disclosure in the
specification of how to obtain any DNA sequences coding for HBGFs other
than the specific cDNAs set forth in the application, these broader claims
might not be fully supported by an enabling disclosure.85
B.

Nonobviousness Of The NIH Inventions

Turning to the facts of the NIH applications with these cases in mind,
we first distinguish between the method used to obtain the sequences and
the sequences that were thereby obtained. We note that the '831 application
claimed the method used to obtain the sequences as a patentable invention.
Because '831 was converted to a Statutory Invention Registration ("SIR") and
because the claims of a SIR are not examined for novelty and
nonobviousness, the PTO did not pass on the obviousness of the method,
and we lack the technical competence to make this determination ourselves.
Nonetheless, there is some evidence on the face of the specifications that the
methods (described as employing "conventional automated DNA
sequencing technology") and materials (commercially available and custom
made cDNA libraries) used to obtain the sequences were substantially

84 Id.
85 Id.
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disclosed in the prior art. Moreover, reactions in the scientific community
to news of the NIH patent filings indicate that some scientists at the time
viewed the technology used to obtain the sequences as not requiring more
than ordinary inventive skill.86
On the other hand, perhaps it could be argued that the prior art
discouraged or taught away from the approach taken by Venter and his
colleagues in the relevant time period. The '195 specification indicates that,
contrary to the expectations of the scientific community, the applicants had
used cDNA screening and sequencing to discover a large number of
heretofore unknoWll human genes. If the prior art gave reason to doubt that
the method used would yield the results obtained, it might be argued that
the method was nonobvious, and that the nonobviousness of the method
should confer patentability on the results (i.e., the sequences). But even if the
method used by Venter and his colleagues was nonobvious as of the '831
filing date, this fact would at most confer patentability on sequences claimed
prior to the time that the method was placed in the public domain. Once the
method was publicly disclosed, the nonobviousness of any subsequently
discovered sequences could not be predicated on the nonobviousness of the
method itself, because the method would be in the prior art.

Thus the

potential significance of the nonobviousness of the Venter methodology in
making an affirmative case for patentability is quite limited.
Even if the method used to obtain the sequences is obvious, it does
not necessarily follow that the sequences themselves are also obvious.
Although the matter is by no means free from doubt, we now think it is more
likely than not that the Federal Circuit would focus on the structure of the
claimed sequences rather than on the method of obtaining them in assessing
their obviousness. The decisions of the Federal Circuit in In

re Deuel88 suggest that if the prior

re Bell87 and In

art does not include structurally similar

sequences, the sequences themselves will not be deemed obvious. Under
this approach, at the very least those claims that are narrowly drawn to
specific, novel sequences with no significant partial homologies to known
sequences will probably be considered nonobvious. On the other hand, any

86

See e.g., John Casey, The Gene Kings, BUSINESS WEEK, May 22, 1995, at 25.

87

991 F.2d 781, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

88

51 F.3d 1552, 1558, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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sequences that have significant partial similarities to known sequences may
be considered prima fade obvious if they were obtained through an obvious
method and if the prior art sequences were of sufficient interest to motivate
the search for other, similar sequences.
Although the Federal Circuit now twice has endorsed this structural
approach to

determinations of

obviousness for DNA sequences of

specifically identified genes, it is still not entirely clear that the court would
eschew consideration of the obviousness of the method of obtaining
sequences in considering the patentability of random partial cDNA
sequences of unknown function of the sort claimed in the NIH patent
applications.

Such an approach would seem to make all novel DNA

sequences patentable, however trivial the scientific advance that led to their
identification.

This position collapses the novelty and nonobviousness

requirements for DNA sequences.

Moreover, a rigid requirement of

structural similarity to a known sequence before a DNA sequence will be
considered prima fade obvious seems to ignore the reason why structural
similarities have been considered relevant to past determinations of the
obviousness of new compounds in favor of rote incantation of the facts on
which prior decisions have turned, a dubious basis for deciding new cases
involving new facts.
The reason that structural similarity to a compound in the prior art
has been considered relevant to prima fade obviousness in past decisions in
the chemical field is that the usefulness of a prior art compound is presumed
to provide the motivation to search for homologues.89 With this motivation,
it is likely that others working in the field will use known methods to find
similar compounds, and only if the compounds obtained from such a search
possess surprising properties not present in the prior art will they be
nonobvious and therefore patentable.
A superficial analogy to these past cases might seem to call for an
inquiry into w hether the prior art disclosed sequences that were structurally
similar to those found by Venter. But a more reasoned approach instead
might ask whether the prior art provided comparable motivation to others
working in the field to do what Venter and his colleagues did in 1991. While
we have not undertaken a comprehensive review of the technical literature,
we note that the 1988 report of the National Research Council on Mapping

89

In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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and Sequencing the Human Genome devotes a couple of pages to analyzing
the relative merits of cDNA sequencing versus genomic DNA sequencing,
suggesting that there was significant (if, in the view of the authors of that
report, misguided) support for focussing the resources of the Human
Genome Project initially on sequencing large libraries of cDNAs.90 It does
not necessarily follow that other investigators would be motivated to
undertake large-scale partial sequencing of randomly selected cDNA clones
of the sort pursued by Venter, as opposed to more focussed searches for
particular genes of interest.
But whatever the level of motivation to engage in such sequencing
prior to Venter's 1991 disclosure, that disclosure set off a frenzy of cDNA
sequencing activity that continues to this day. Under these circumstances it
seems reasonable to conclude that, at least since late 1991, the prior art has
disclosed enough to motivate others working in the field to find new ESTs
through random partial sequencing of clones from cDNA libraries.
Therefore, the sequences obtained subsequent to that date by Venter and
others through the same general method might be deemed prima fade
obvious, even if there are no structurally similar sequences in the prior art,
for the same reason that past decisions have held novel chemicals prima
fade obvious when the prior art discloses structurally similar compounds:
in both cases, the prior art provides motivation to use familiar methods to
construct the claimed inventions. We reiterate, however, that the Federal
Circuit so far has not taken this approach, and that its decisions in In
and

re Bell91

In re Deuel92 cast some doubt on its willingness to do so.
It could be argued that finding prirna fade obviousness on the basis

of the method of sequencing alone violates the statement in section 103 of the
Patent Act93 that "patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made."94 On the other hand, a finding of prirna

90

NATIONAL REsEARCH COUNCIL, MAPPING AND SEQUENCING THE HUMAN

GENOME

(1988).

91

991 F.2d 781, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

92

51 F.3d 1552, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

93

35 u.s.c. § 103 (1994).

94 Id.
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facie obviousness does not necessarily "negative" patentability, but merely
shifts to the applicant the burden of showing unexpected properties of the
claimed inventions not present or suggested in the prior art. This approach
has the benefit of withholding patent protection from newly discovered
chemicals until the inventor is in a position to disclose more about them than
their structure alone.

But perhaps lack of utility is a more appropriate

doctrinal basis for rejecting such applications than obviousness.
If prima facie obviousness is established, could NIH sustain its
burden of showing unexpected properties for the claimed sequences?
Perhaps they could do so with a little more work, but we do not believe that
they have done so to date. For the most part all that we know about the
disclosed sequences is that they are portions of human genes, which is to be
expected of partial sequences obtained from human cDNA. In Ex parte
Anderson,95 the Board affirmed an obviousness rejection of claims to a DNA
sequence encoding a mature human interleukin-3 ("IL-3") protein having a
proline residue at position 8 over prior art disclosing a DNA sequence
encoding an IL-3 protein having serine at position 8. The structural
similarity gave rise to a prima facie case of obviousness and shifted to the
applicants the burden of offering rebuttal evidence showing that the claimed
compositions possess unexpected improved properties or properties that the
prior art does not have.96 The Board held that the fact that the claimed IL-3
sequence with proline at position 8 was the dominant allele was not
sufficient to overcome the prima facie case of obviousness without an
explanation of the practical advantages that come from having possession
of the dominant allele.97 NIH has not even made this much of a showing
about the properties of its sequences.

In

sum, although the nonobviousness of the claimed sequences is

uncertain, on the basis of recent decisions of the Federal Circuit we think it
is more likely than not that nonobviousness could be established for those
sequences that are not similar to any previously known sequences. If any of
the sequences show partial sequence similarity to known sequences, they
may be considered prima facie obvious. One could argue that the prior art
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30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1866 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1993).

% Id.

at 1869.

97 Id.

at 1870.
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since 1991 has plainly disclosed enough information to motivate those
working in the field to apply routine sequencing techniques to obtain partial
sequences for randomly selected clones from cDNA libraries, and that all
sequences obtained since that date should therefore be deemed prim.a fade
obvious.

However, the Federal Circuit has not endorsed this analytical

approach, and its most recent decisions suggest a far lower standard of
nonobviousness for DNA sequences. If any of the sequences are considered
prima fade obvious, it does not appear that NIH has sustained its burden of
showing that the sequences possess surprising or unexpected properties.
While

recent

Federal

Circuit

decisions

suggest

that

the

nonobviousness requirement may be more readily satisfied for ESTs than
was previously thought, these decisions also call into question a key
argument in favor of patenting ESTs.

In

the debate over patenting ESTs,

some people argued that if ESTs were published without obtaining patent
protection,

their

disclosure

would

render

obvious,

and

therefore

unpatentable, the full-length genes of which they are a part, thereby
preventing subsequent researchers and firms who wish to develop
commercial products based on such genes from obtaining exclusive rights
under a patent.98 Patents on ESTs, and on the full-length genes that could be
obtained by using ESTs as probes, would therefore provide an otherwise
unavailable source of exclusive rights to protect the interests of those who
develop commercial products related to genes for which ESTs have been
publicly disclosed.
This argument hinges on disclosure of partial DNA sequences
rendering full-length genes obvious. But if partial or even full amino acid
sequences for a protein are not sufficient to make the corresponding DNA
sequence obvious, it seems unlikely that a partial DNA sequence would
make the full-length DNA sequence obvious. Thus the Federal Circuit's
position that the obviousness of a method for obtaining a DNA sequence is
irrelevant to the obviousness of the sequence itself is a two-edged sword in
the debate over patenting ESTs, serving on one hand to reduce the force of
an argument against the patentability of ESTs, while on the other hand
undermining arguments for the necessity of obtaining such patents to
safeguard the commercial viability of future products.

98 See, e.g., Reid Adler, Genome Research: Fulfilling the Public's Expectations
for Knowledge and Commercialization, 257 ScIENCE 908, 911-12 (1992).
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Although we trunk it is unlikely that disclosure of ESTs will make the
corresponding full-length genes obvious and therefore unpatentable,
disclosure of full-length genes may well render obvious related genes with
similar DNA sequences. We can foresee this issue arising in the near future
as the owners of private EST databases take newly discovered genes of
interest that are published by others, compare them to the previously
undisclosed sequences in their databases, obtain full-length sequences for
any ESTs that show similarities to the newly identified genes, and file patent
applications on them. If such a strategy is successful, it could give the
owners of EST databases the power to fence-in the patent rights of those who
have identified new genes of interest by obtaining patents on all related
genes. Will these related genes be considered prima fade obvious by virtue
of their structural similarity to the publicly disclosed sequences? Certainly
the initial disclosure of one member of an interesting gene family would
provide motivation to others working in the field to probe available
sequence databases for related genes, perhaps with a reasonable expectation
of success.99 Yet structural similarity, rather than motivation and reasonable
expectation of success, seems to be the cornerstone of the Federal Circuit's
nonobviousness analysis in this area to date.100 Moreover, some of the more
expansive language from In re Deuel could be understood as requiring that
the prior art allow the structure of the subsequently discovered genes to be
"precisely envisioned" before they would be considered obvious, suggesting
a rather exacting standard of structural similarity. Resolution of the issue
may thus tum on the degree of similarity between the prior art sequences
and the related sequences found through use of the EST databases. Those
who discover new genes of interest and do not wish to have their patent
rights fenced in would be well advised to identify and claim related

99

As more sequences are entered in public domain databases that are
freely available to the scientific community, the likelihood of success in
finding related genes increases, making it more likely that the related
genes would be deemed obvious. On the other hand, sequences that could
only be obtained through access to a proprietary sequence database that
is not generally available to the scientific community might still be
considered nonobvious if the database were not included in the prior art.
100

See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210, 1214
(Fed. Cir. 1995). But cf In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 349-50, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1941, 1943 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[G]eneralization is to be avoided
insofar as specific structures are alleged to be prima fade obvious one
from the other.").
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sequences, including those sequences that may be partially disclosed in
public databases, before they publish their results.
VI.

DISCLOSURE

In recent years, the Federal Circuit and the PTO have frequently
invoked the disclosure requirements set forth in section 1 12 of the Patent Act
in rejecting or holding invalid patent claims involving pNA sequences.101
We believe that many of the claims in these applications may be vulnerable
to challenge on these grounds, particularly the full gene claims and the panel
claims.
Section 1 12 of the Patent Act provides:
The specification shall contain a written
description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it,
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as
to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same,
and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or
more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which
the applicant regards as his invention.102
The courts and the PTO read the first paragraph of this prov1s10n as
imposing three distinct requirements: (1) a written description of the
invention; (2) an enabling disclosure of how to make and use the invention;
and (3) disclosure of the best mode of practicing the invention known to the

1 01

In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1560, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216; Amgen, Inc.
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1016, 1027 (Fed. Cir.) cert. denied sub nom, Genetics Inst., Inc. v. Amgen,
Inc., 112 S.Ct. 169 (1991).
v.

1 02

35 u.s.c. § 112 (1994).
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inventor at the time of filing.103 The second paragraph further requires that
the claim language clearly define the invention.
An inventor who is able to comply with these requirements may
obtain a patent covering subject matter that she has not yet actually reduced
to practice in the laboratory. Thus the Venter applications claim not only the
specific ESTs that had actually been identified and sequenced, but also
complementary sequences, allelic variations and portions thereof, full genes
corresponding or hybridizing to any of the foregoing sequences, fragments
of such full genes, vectors containing any such sequences or genes, panels
of ESTS or sequence fragments, and antisense oligonucleotides or triple helix
probes capable of blocking expression of the products of the full genes.
The examiner rejected the claims of the '195 application for lack of an
enabling disclosure, lack of an adequate written description of the
inventions, and indefiniteness of the claim language. We consider each of
these issues in tum.
A.

Enablement/Scope

The requirement of an enabling disclosure of how to make and use
the invention is justified as a means of ensuring that the public receives its
quid pro quo for the patent monopoly. To the extent that it focuses on
disclosure of how to use an invention, this requirement overlaps with the
utility requirement discussed above.
Enablement is a particularly important limitation on the patentability
of prophetic claims to inventions that the applicant has not yet actually
reduced to practice. What is required is a disclosure that would allow a
person of ordinary skill in the field to reduce the invention to practice
without "undue experimentation."104
What constitutes "undue
experimentation" varies from one field to the next.

103

Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1565
(Fed. Cir. 1995); Transco Prods., Inc., v. Performance Contracting, Inc., 38
F.3d 551, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Vas-Cath, Inc. v.
Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

104 Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1 164, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 739 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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The enablement requirement should not present a significant barrier
to the patenting of DNA sequences that have been fully and accurately set
forth in the specification. But some of the claims extend beyond those
disclosed sequences to cover other sequences (including full genes operably
coding for human gene products) that might ultimately be obtained by using
the ESTs as probes. In rejecting the claims of the '195 application for failure
to provide an enabling disclosure, the examiner noted that the specification
lacked information about the coding regions of the disclosed DNA
sequences, and questioned whether the ESTs in fact have coding regions:
Applicants assert that one of skill in the art
can determine coding regions with routine
skill and then spend three pages briefly
outlining the cloning, selection, sequencing,
and sequence analyses and judgments needed
to make the determination.
These
manipulations are more than routine
experimentation. . . . Even though the ESTs of
the instant application were derived from
cDNA, the application fails to establish that
each and every expressed sequence has a
protein coding region or whether a given EST
that has a protein coding region is eventually
translated. Some of the RNAs from which the
ESTs were derived may not be mRNAs or
may be mRNAs that are not translated.
Whether these prophetic claims are enabled by the disclosure is
ultimately a technical question that is beyond our expertise. Nonetheless, we
note that decisions of the Federal Circuit in biotechnology cases seem to
reflect a more generous view than the examiner appears to hold of how
much experimentation may be tolerated before a disclosure will be
considered nonenabling. For example, in In re Wands, 105 the Federal Circuit
reversed a rejection of claims to an immunoassay utilizing monoclonal high
affinity immunoglobulin M antibodies, even though the antibodies described
in the disclosure could not be produced without going through extensive
procedures to prepare hybridomas and to screen them for production of the
desired antibodies. The court noted that there was a high level of skill in the

105

858 F.2d 731, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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monoclonal antibody art, that all of the methods needed to practice the
invention were well known to those of ordinary skill in the art, that the
disclosure provided considerable direction and guidance on how to practice
the invention and presented working examples, that the nature of
monoclonal antibody technology is that it involves screening hybridomas to
determine which ones secrete antibodies with desired characteristics, and
that practitioners in this field routinely engage in such screening.
M�ny decisions of the Board involving claims to DNA sequences
coding for proteins of known function and partially known amino acid
sequence indicate that techniques for obtaining cDNAs using hybridization
probes are well-known in the art.106 It arguably follows that the use of E STs
as probes to obtain full genes does not involve undue experimentation.
On the other hand, a salient distinction between these prior decisions
and the present case is that the Venter applications for the most part do not
suggest the use of any particular E ST as a probe for finding any particular
gene, whereas the disclosures at issue in the prior cases suggested the use of
particular probes to find target genes. The work that remains to be done to
find a target gene is analogous to searching for a particular individual in a
telephone directory that has the names and addresses omitted. Even if we
assume that each phone number will lead the caller to someone-an
assumption that may or may not have a valid corollary for E STs-the
compilation of information is of limited value in finding any given person,
even if that person does in fact have a telephone number in the directory and
would pick up the phone if the correct number were dialed. Nor, to our
knowledge, is this sort of screening effort routine in the field, in contrast to
the effort involved in screening hybridomas to identify producers of desired
antibodies that the Federal Circuit concluded did not amount to undue

experimentation in In re Wands.107 Therefore, it might be argued that undue
experimentation is required to find full genes of interest using the Venter
disclosures.

106

See, e.g., Ex parte Deuel, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1445 (Bd. Pat. App. &
Interf. 1993), rev 'd on other grounds sub nom., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 34
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Ex parte Movva, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1027 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1993).
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A case involving somewhat analogous facts is Ex parte Tanksley108 in
which the Board affirmed the examiner's rejection of claims to tomato cDNA
clones on grounds of obviousness and failure to identify distinctly the
claimed inventions. The Board went on to note that, in the event of further
prosecution, the examiner should consider whether undue experimentation
is required to practice the invention given that each of the uses suggested by
applicants for their inventions involved, as a preliminary step, the
identification of clones of interest, a procedure that the prior art suggested
involves significant difficulty. A similar argument could be made with
respect to many of the claims in the NIH applications, which cover DNA
sequences that may not be put to use without first identifying, through
nonroutine experimentation, which of the many sequences are of interest for
which possible purposes.
The enabling disclosure requirement also serves as a limitation on the
permissible breadth of patent claims, providing a basis for rejecting broad,
generic claims for which only a small number of embodiments have been
disclosed. A number of decisions have invalidated broad patent claims to
DNA sequences on the ground that the disclosure is not as broad as the
claims. For example, in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical, 109 the Federal
Circuit affirmed a lower court decision holding invalid a broad generic claim
covering all DNA sequences that will encode any polypeptide having an
amino acid sequence sufficiently duplicative of erythropoietin (EPO) to
possess the property of increasing production of red blood cells. The basis
for the holding was that the broad claim was not adequately enabled by the
disclosure in the specification of details for preparing only a few EPO analog
genes:
Amgen has claimed every possible analog of
a gene containing about 4,000 nucleotides,
with a disclosure only of how to make EPO
and a very few analogs . . . . Considering the
structural complexity of the EPO gene, the
manifold possibilities for change in its
structure, with attendant uncertainty as to

108

26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1388 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1992).

HJ9 927 F.2d 1200, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 1 12 S.
Ct. 169 (1991).
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what utility will be possessed by these
analogs, we consider that more is needed
concerning identifying the various analogs
that are within the scope of the claim,
methods for making them, and structural
requirements for producing compounds with
EPO-like activity. It is not sufficient, having
made the gene and a handful of analogs
whose activity has not been clearly
ascertained, to claim all possible genetic
sequences that have EPO-like activity.110
The Board took a similar approach in Ex parte Ishizaka,111 affirming
rejection on grounds of obviousness of claims to DNA sequences encoding
glycosylation inhibiting factors ("GIFs") and setting forth as a new ground
of rejection failure to provide an enabling disclosure corresponding to the
breadth of the claims. The claims purported to cover fragments of the
disclosed nucleotide sequences of as few as eighteen to twenty bases which
are capable of being used as hybridization probes to obtain additional
nucleic acids encoding GIF, as well as "a sequence of nucleotides effectively
homologous" to such sequences, defined in the specification to mean at least
fifty percent homologous. The Board noted that there was no disclosure in
the specification showing that any such small fragments had been or could
be so employed by others without undue experimentation112 and cited
Amgen in concluding that the broad claims to fragments and homologous
sequences were not adequately enabled.113
The NIH patent applications contain many claims that are
comparable to those held invalid in these decisions, including, in particular,

110

111

112

113

Id. at 1214, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027-28.
24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1621, 1625-26 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1992).

Id. at 1626.
Id.

PATENTABILITY OF GENE FRAGMENTS

1995

43

the full gene claims114 and the panel claims, 115 and are no better supported in
the specification.

Indeed, these broad

NIH claims may be particularly

vulnerable to challenge on this ground because the specifications contain no
empirically-tested working examples to support them.
The Federal Circuit stressed the importance of working examples in

In re Vaeck.116

In that case the applicant claimed a chimeric gene comprising

a gene for an insecticidal protein derived from a
with a

Bacillus bacterium united

DNA promoter effective for expressing the Bacillus gene in a host

cyanobacterium, as well as plasmids containing the chimeric gene and host
cyanobacteria expressing the gene.
particular

The specification disclosed two

Bacillus species as sources of insecticidal protein and nine genera

114 Representative of the full gene claims are claims 4 and 10 of the '195
application. As amended, the language of claim 4 reads as follows:
An isolated

polynucleotide operably coding for a native
human polypeptide or protein, which includes a region
coding for the same amino acid sequence as a native
human coding region corresponding to a sequence
designated as one of [the disclosed ESTs].
As amended, the language of claim 10 reads as follows:
An isolated polynucleotide coding for a human protein
or polypeptide, which includes a coding region
corresponding to [one of the disclosed ESTs]; or a
polynucleotide complementary thereto.

Each of these claims potentially covers a great many sequences, none of
which has been set forth in the specification.
115 Consider, for example, claim 22 of the '195 application, which, as
amended, claims:

A panel of at least 100 isolated polynucleotides having
the sequences of [one of the ESTs or a fragment thereof
at least 150 base pairs in length].
An astronomical number of such panels could be constructed out of the
disclosed sequences, but no such panel is actually disclosed in the
specification much less tested to see if it can be used for tissue typing or
forensic identification as asserted.
116

947 F.2d 488, 495, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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of cyanobacteria as useful hosts, but gave only a single working example
detailing the transformation of one strain of cyanobacteria. In affirming the
examiner's rejection for lack of enablement of the full breadth of the claims,
the Federal Circuit noted that "[t]here is no reasonable correlation between
the narrow disclosure in appellants' specification and the broad scope of
protection sought in the claims encompassing gene expression in any and all
cyanobacteria."117 More recently, in In re Goodman, 118 the Federal Circuit
affirmed rejection of broad claims to a method for producing mammalian
peptides in plant cells supported by a disclosure of only a single working
example involving the expression of gamma-interferon in tobacco plants.
The court concluded that the specification did not adequately enable the
broad scope of the claims.
Enablement is a peculiarly fact-driven inquiry, and the facts of these
cases can certainly be distinguished from the NIH applications.
Nonetheless, these and other decisions of the Federal Circuit and the Board
suggest a parsimonious attitude toward claim scope for biotechnology
patents, restricting claimants to that which they have demonstrated can be
done successfully through their own working examples. While the Federal
Circuit consistently has affirmed that it is sometimes appropriate to allow
generic claims covering more than the particular examples disclosed in the
specification even in unpredictable fields,119 as the number of variations
embraced by a claim multiply, the court seems to disapprove of broad patent
claims that are supported by only a small number of working examples.
This trend does not bode well for broad prophetic claims, such as most of
those sought by NIH, that are not supported by any empirically-tested
working examples.
B.

Written Description

A related difficulty in claiming subject matter that goes beyond what
the inventor has actually reduced to practice is the written description
requirement. The Federal Circuit views this requirement as "separate and
distinct" from the enablement requirement: "The purpose of the 'written

117

118

1 19

Id.

11 F.3d 1046, 1052, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2010, 2015 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
E .g. ,

Vaeck, 947 F.2d at 496, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445.
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description' requirement is broader than to merely explain how to 'make and
use;' the applicant must also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled
in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the

invention. The invention is, for purposes of the 'written description' inquiry,
whatever is now claimed. "1 20 In other words, while the purpose of the
enablement requirement is to put the public in possession of the invention,
the purpose of the written description requirement is to ensure that the
inventor was in possession of the invention as of the filing date and is
therefore entitled to claim that date as the prima facie date of invention. The
written description requirement most commonly presents a problem in cases
where an applicant subsequently seeks to claim the benefit of a previous
filing date in support of claims that were not included in the application as
originally filed,1 21 but in Fiers v. Revel the Federal Circuit invoked the written
description requirement in rejecting prophetic claims to a DNA sequence
filed before the inventor had actually obtained the sequence.122

Fiers v. Revel was a three-way priority contest among rival foreign
claimants to patent rights in the DNA sequence coding for human fibroblast
beta-interferon ("P-IF"). Understanding this decision requires a brief
digression into arcane rules for determining priority of invention under U. S.
patent law. Section 102(g) of the Patent Act calls for determining priority of
invention by reference to the competing claimants' respective dates of
conception and reduction to practice of the invention, and also "the
reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to
practice." Reduction to practice may be either "actual" (i.e., making a
tangible embodiment of the invention in the laboratory) or "constructive"
(i.e., filing a patent application that provides an adequate disclosure of the
invention). Filing a foreign patent application is sufficient to establish

120

Vas-Cath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1 1 1 1, 1 1 16 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original).

121

This may happen when an applicant adds new claims by amendment,
or seeks the benefit of the filing date of an earlier-filed foreign or U.S.
application for claims of a later-filed application, or, in an interference
proceeding, when rival applicants claim patent rights corresponding to an
interference count that differs somewhat from the claims they had
originally filed.
122

Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1 1 70-71, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601, 1606
(Fed. Cir. 1993).
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priority as of the foreign filing date so long as the foreign application meets
the disclosure requirements of U. S. patent law, but an applicant who seeks
to prove a priority date prior to the filing date may not rely on any activities
that occurred overseas. 123
Fiers sought to establish priority by proving that he was first to
conceive of the invention and was diligent thereafter up to his British filing
date. His British application included a disclosure of the complete DNA
sequence for the gene. He claimed that his conception occurred when he
disclosed a method for isolating the gene to American scientists who brought
his protocol back to the United States. These scientists submitted affidavits
stating that the protocol was enabling-Le., that one of ordinary skill in the
field would have been able to follow the protocol to isolate P-IF DNA
without undue experimentation. Fiers sought to distinguish the Amgen
decision on this basis, arguing that, in contrast to the uncertainties attending
the method held to be nonenabling in that case (screening a genomic DNA
library with fully degenerate probes to find the EPO gene), his own method
for finding the P-IF gene could have been easily carried out by one of
ordinary skill in the art. The Federal Circuit rejected this narrow reading of
Amgen, 124 holding that "irrespective of the complexity or simplicity of the
method of isolation employed, conception of a DNA, like conception of any
chemical substance, requires a definition of that substance other than by its
functional utility."1 25 In other words, proof that the applicants were in
possession of an operative method of obtaining the DNA was not sufficient
to establish conception of the DNA itself. Conception only of a process for
making the DNA would at most support a subsequent product-by-process
claim to the DNA obtained by the disclosed process, and would not support

12
3

35 U.S.C. §§ 102(g), 104 (1994). The implementing legislation for the
North American Free Trade Agreement changed U.S. law to permit
inventive activities in Canada and Mexico to be proven in support of a
priority claim. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 182, 107 Stat. 2057.
1 24

1 25

Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1 168, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604.
Id.

at 1 1 69, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604.
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a broader claim to the DNA itself without limitation as to the means by
which it is obtained.126
The court invoked a similar principle in dismissing Revel's claim to
priority on the basis of his earlier-filed Israeli patent application.127 The
Israeli application disclosed a method for isolating a fragment of the DNA
coding for P-IF as well as a method for isolating mRNA coding for P-IF, but
did not disclose a complete DNA sequence. The Federal Circuit concurred

126
A product-by-process claim is a claim to a product defined in the claim
language in terms of the method by which it is made. Most decisions hold
that such claims are limited in scope to products made by the particular
method recited in the claim language and would not cover identical
products made by other methods. See, e.g., Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v.
Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 842, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir.
1992), although, there is some authority for the view that the recited
process does not limit the scope of product-by-process claims. See, e.g.,
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583,
18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Following Fiers, NIH
submitted new claims 44-55 of '195 in product-by-process form. The
Federal Circuit did not clearly indicate that such claims would be
patentable in Fiers, but merely stated that disclosure of an enabling
method for obtaining a gene would at most support a claim to the gene in
product-by-process form:

Our statement in Amgen that conception may occur,
inter alia, when one is able to define a chemical by its
method of preparation requires that the DNA be
claimed by its method of preparation. . . . Before
reduction to practice, conception only of a process for
making a substance, without a conception of a
structural or equivalent definition of that substance, can
at most constitute a conception of the substance claimed
as a process. Conception of a substance claimed per se
without reference to a process requires conception of its
structure, name, formula, or definitive chemical or
physical properties.
984 F.2d at 1 169, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604-05. Even if the NIH
disclosures are considered enabling as to the full gene claims, we note
that, if those claims are limited to full genes obtained by the recited
process, the effective scope of the patent monopoly would be quite
narrow, as would the commercial significance of the patents.
127

Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1170-71, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606.
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with the finding of the Board that Revel's disclosure was insufficient to
satisfy the "written description" requirement of section 1 12 of the Patent
128
Act, noting that the Board had correctly stated that this provision requires
a disclosure that is adequate to convey to others in the same field that the
inventor was in possession of the claimed invention as of the filing date:
An adequate written description of a DNA
requires more thclll a mere statement that it is
part of the invention and reference to a
potential method for isolating it; what is
required is a description of the DNA itself.
Revel's specification does not do that. . . . A
bare reference to a DNA with a statement that
it can be obtained by reverse transcription is
not a description; it does not indicate that
Revel was in possession of the DNA... . As
we stated in Amgen and reaffirmed above,
such a disclosure just represents a wish, or
arguably a plan, for obtaining the DNA. If a
conception of a DNA requires a precise
definition, such as by structure, formula,
chemical name, or physical properties, as we
have held, then a description also requires
that degree of specificity. To paraphrase the
Board, one cannot describe what one has not
129
conceived.
This decision potentially presents a major obstacle to the patenting
of prophetic claims to DNA sequences that have not yet been set forth in the
specifications and would appear to render unpatentable most of the
commercially significant claims of the NIH applications. Only those claims
that are limited to the disclosed E STs themselves, and perhaps product-by
process claims to other sequences obtained through the use of those
sequences as probes, would appear to satisfy the written description
requirement as articulated by the Federal Circuit in Fiers.

128

129

Id. at

1 170, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606.

Id. at

1 1 70-71, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606.

PATENTABILITY OF GENE FRAGMENTS

1995

49

We think it is unlikely that the Board will read the Fiers decision
narrowly. In Fiddes v. Baird,130 the Board cited Fiers in a priority contest over
inventorship of recombinant DNA molecules encoding fibroblast growth
factors ("FGFs"). Baird claimed priority on the basis of an application that set
forth the amino acid sequence for bovine pituitary FGF and a theoretical
DNA sequence encoding that protein, along with a method for obtaining a
cDNA corresponding to the protein, but not the naturally occurring gene
encoding the protein. The Board held that this disclosure did not contain a
written description for the broad class of mammalian FGFs, and further
questioned whether the disclosure was enabling even for Baird's narrower
claims to the native gene encoding bovine pituitary FGF.131
One could try to distinguish these cases by arguing that the written
description requirement, like the enablement requirement, becomes easier
to satisfy as the state of knowledge advances in a field. The standard is
whether the written description is adequate to convey to other skilled
practitioners in the field that the applicant was in possession of the invention
at the time of filing. As genetics research has advanced, it may have become
increasingly routine to use a probe to find a gene, such that by the time of
the NIH filings other practitioners might have regarded someone who had
found an EST as being for all practical purposes in possession of the
corresponding full-length gene.
One problem with this line of argument is that it seems to overlook
the distinction that the Federal Circuit has consistently maintained between
the enablement and written description requirements. Indeed, in Fiers v.
Revel1 32 the court rejected the priority claims of both Fiers and Revel without
challenging their assertions that their disclosures were enabling.
The message that emerges from these decisions is that the
patentability of a DNA sequence is doubtful until one can set forth the actual
sequence. Unless the Federal Circuit and PTO retreat from this position, it
is unlikely that an applicant could claim a full-length gene by disclosing
nothing more than a partial sequence and a probing methodology. The

130

131

132

30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1483 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1993).

Id.
984 F.2d at 1 171, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605-06.
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written description requirement, as recently construed in cases involving
claims to DNA sequences, appears to be an insurmountable hurdle for all of
the claims in the NIH applications that go beyond the sequences actually set
forth in the specification. Even a fully enabling disclosure of how to use a
probe to find a full-length gene will not be sufficient to support a claim to the
full-length gene, except perhaps in narrow, product-by-process form. In that
case, as a practical matter, it may be that the allowable claims could not
confer a commercially effective monopoly in anything more than the ESTs
themselves.
C.

Definiteness

A further difficulty for some of the claims is the requirement that the
claim language "particularly [point] out and distinctly [claim] the subject
matter which the applicant regards as his invention."133 The purpose of the
requirement for definite claim language is twofold: (1) to allow proper
examination for patentability; and (2) to give notice to the public of what
constitutes infringement.134 This requirement is likely to be particularly
problematic for claims to sequences that have not been identified in the
specification. In Ex parte Tanksley, 135 the Board affirmed the examiner's
rejection of claims to selected tomato cDNA clones that had not been
sequenced and, for the most part, had not been identified by biological
function, on the ground that the clones had not been adequately described
to allow either proper examination in comparison to the prior art or
adequate notice to the public of what the claims cover.
We have already noted in the discussion of novelty above that many
of the claims cover sequences that are not set forth in the specification and
that may not even include sequences set forth in the specification. Thus, for
example, claim 1 7 of '195 covers any polynucleotide fragment of at least 150
base pairs from any gene corresponding to any of the disclosed ESTs. There
is no way that an examiner can effectively search the prior art to see if it
includes any sequences covered by this claim. Nor does the claim language
give notice to the public of the scope of its coverage. Both of the policy
133

35 u.s.c. § 112 (1994).

134
Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 277, 80
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 451, 453 (1949).
1

35

26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1386 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1992).
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interests behind the requirement for clear and definite claim language are
thus squarely implicated by the facts of this case.
In sum, the requirements of an enabling disclosure, written
description of the invention, and definiteness of claim language appear not
to be satisfied for many of the claims of these patent applications,
particularly those claims that cover sequences and panels of sequences that
are not set forth in the specification. While we lack the technical expertise to
offer a definitive opinion on the question of enablement, the absence of
working examples and the apparent need for nonroutine screening in order
to identify which sequences or panels are suitable for which purposes,
suggest that the claims may be vulnerable to challenge on enablement
grounds. Moreover, the breadth of some of the claims appears to exceed the
scope of enablement under the standards of recent Federal Circuit and Board
decisions, particularly in light of the absence of empirically-tested working
examples. Claims directed to sequences that are not set forth in the
specification also appear to lack an adequate written description as that
requirement was articulated for DNA sequences by the Federal Circuit in
Fiers v. Revel. 136 The absence of sequence information supporting these
claims also makes the scope of the claims indefinite, in violation of the
statutory requirement that the claims "particularly [point] out and distinctly
[claim]" the subject matter of the invention.137 Those claims that are limited
to the sequences that have actually been identified and set forth in the
specification are not vulnerable to these challenges.
VII.

CONCLUSION

We believe that most of the claims set forth in the NIH patent
applications probably are not patentable. Although the matter is not entirely
free from doubt, we believe that it is more likely than not that the Federal
Circuit would hold all of the claims invalid for lack of utility. The asserted
utilities that appear most likely to satisfy the "practical utility" standard of
Brenner v. Manson138 either involve vaguely defined medical or therapeutic
uses, with no indication in the specification of which sequences will serve

136

984 F.2d at 1 1 72, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.

137

35 u.s.c. § 1 12 (1994).

138

383 U.S. 519, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689 (1966).
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which diagnostic or therapeutic purposes, or else would require further non
routine experimentation to carry out. Those utilities that are most credibly
enabled on the face of the specification, such as use of the ESTs as markers
or probes, are most vulnerable to the challenge that they do not amount to
practical utility in currently available form.
The claims that cover sequences and panels of sequences that have
not been specifically set forth in the applications are vulnerable to challenge
on a number of further grounds. Particularly significant in light of recent
caselaw is that they are not supported by an adequate written decision.
They may also lack an enabling disclosure or be overly broad relative to the
scope of disclosure.

Because they cannot be effectively compared to the

prior art and do not give clear notice of what they cover, they may be
challenged as lacking the requisite clarity and definiteness of claim language.
Moreover, it is impossible to determine whether they satisfy the novelty
standard.
We are uncertain on the basis of existing caselaw whether any of the
sequences satisfy the nonobviousness requirement.

Most likely to be

vulnerable to a rejection for obviousness are those sequences that are similar
to sequences disclosed in the prior art and were obtained through a method
that was disclosed or suggested in the prior art. Such sequences might be
considered prima fade obvious, in which case it would be necessary to show
that they have surprising properties not shared by the prior art sequences in
order to establish their patentability.

On the other hand, in cases where

there are no similar sequences in the prior art, recent Federal Circuit
decisions suggest that this approach improperly conflates the method of
identifying the sequences with the sequences themselves. Because they are
most likely to satisfy the requirements of enablement, written description,
and particularity of claim language, the claims that are most likely to be
patentable are those that are limited to the actual ESTs disclosed in the
patent applications. Patent rights that are limited to such claims are unlikely
to be an effective vehicle for technology transfer, however. The primary
value of such sequences is in their use as research tools, a use that is unlikely
to be inhibited by the absence of patent rights. Indeed, the use of ESTs as
research tools might be more attractive to researchers and institutions who
are assured that NIH does not and will not claim patent rights to subsequent
discoveries that might be facilitated by access to the sequences.

